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Morality in the Marketplace: Consumer
Protection, Regulatory Policy, and
Jewish Law
ARTHUR GROSS SCHAEFER* AND BEVERLY BICKEL"
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent article discussing consumer protection predicted, "[i]f
this country ever fights another civil war, it will be retailers versus
consumers."l
Modern consumers need protection more than ever due to the
increasing complexity of information available in today's market.
In the nineteenth century, innovation and technical changes were
usually concerned about improving existing products rather than
creating new products.' Around the turn of the century, dramatic
changes took place.3 Innovations such as telephones, motorcycles,
and canned foods appeared. By the 1950's, the introduction of
new items escalated; televisions, synthetic fibers, detergents, frozen
foods, long-playing records, color film, ballpoint pens, and plastics
were introduced.4 Today, in the age of the microchip, new
products seem to be introduced daily.' Along with these new
products, the amount of information is increasing at an amazing
speed. So much information exists about so many things that it is
impossible to be fully informed about everything.' There are
almost 850,000 new publications released each year throughout the
* Associate Professor, College of Business, Loyola Marymount University, Los
Angeles, California.
** J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California, 1995.
1. Lee Green, Service with a Scowl, L.A. TIMES MAG., Mar. 5, 1989, at 24, 25.
2. Ross CRANSTON, CONSUMERS AND THE LAW 1 (1978).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 304-
39 (1988).
6. IAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER PROTECTION TEXT AND MATERIALS 46 (1989).
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world.7 Simply put, providing more information does not neces-
sarily mean that the consumer will be able to understand the
information and use it to make an informed decision.'
This Article suggests that current U.S. legislation is inadequate
to protect consumers in an increasingly confusing and complex
marketplace and offers ancient Jewish law as a model for more
comprehensive regulation.
Some might argue that ancient legal systems, especially if
religiously-based, are interesting but largely irrelevant to the
current debate over consumer protection. One author asserts:
"Any attempt to correlate a secular system with a religious legal
system risks serious anachronism, may give rise to individious [sic]
comparisons and the importing of alien categories of thought from
one system to another." 9
Comparative studies are an essential tool in legal analysis.
Moreover, although legal systems may differ, they also have
substantial commonalities. It has been stated that "It]he goal of
law in every civilized society is for the most part the same, namely,
the insurance of order, peace and the protection of the individual
in his person and property against the onslaughts of others
... ,,0 This underlying function of preserving order11 makes
legal theories from different legal structures generally relevant to
one another.
This Article will offer a model for consumer protection
regulation in the United States, based on ancient tenets of Jewish
Law. This Article will first present a general introduction to
Jewish law. This Article will then discuss the modem free market
system and the lack of "perfect information" in the marketplace.
Next, this Article will examine regulation in general, focusing
specifically on the debate over how much information should be
provided to consumers. This Article will then offer examples of
Jewish regulation of the marketplace, emphasizing the role of
morality in consumer protection. Finally, this Article will discuss
7. BILL MOYERS, A WORLD OF IDEAS 183 (1989).
8. Green, supra note 1, at 24, 25.
9. Ronald Warburg, Child Custody: A Comparative Analysis, 14 ISR. L. REV. 480,503
(1979).
10. BOAZ COHEN, JEWISH AND ROMAN LAW at xii (1966).
11. MICHAEL B. METZGER ET AL., BUSINESS LAW AND THE REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT 11-12 (6th ed., 1986); Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of
Exploration of Alien Property, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 553, 571 (1981).
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the goals and values of consumer protection, concluding that
Jewish law provides a more effective and ethical standard for
consumer protection in the marketplace than current U.S.
legislation.
II. GENERAL INTRODUcTION TO JEWISH LAW
Although early Jewish law deals primarily with agricultural
society, it comprises a highly sophisticated system. The Jewish
system "presents one of the most striking examples in human
history of social evolution ... from the rude and savage to the
refined and humane."' 2  Thus, the Bible and early Jewish legal
writings can serve as significant teachers from the past regarding
consumer protection.13
Leviticus stated that "when you sell property to your neighbor,
or buy any from your neighbor, you shall not wrong one anoth-
er.' 1 4  This biblical verse stands for the proposition that one
should not use "sharp" or deceptive practices in business.
Specifically, the Bible prohibits such activities as overcharging"
and using false weights and measures. 6 It is clear from these
general prohibitions that deceitful practices by sellers 7 are not
"permitted and must be differentiated from fair business practice[s]
and fair competition."'"
Thematically, Jewish law recognizes the possibility that sellers
might use their superior bargaining position to take advantage of
buyers. Accordingly, the rabbis expanded and interpreted the
12. GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW 1 (1953).
13. Instead of examining the entire body of Jewish law, only the earliest codes of the
Mishnah (approximately 200 C.E.), the Tosefta (approximately 200 C.E.), and the
Babylonian Talmud (approximately 475 C.E.) are considered. These earlier codes reflect
a more pristine view of society's attempt to codify its religiously-based understanding of
"consumer law" prior to the significant influence of the dominant non-Jewish legal and
political systems. The Mishnah is a codification of oral law compiled by Rabbi Judah the
Patriarch (HaNasi). The Tosefta is a supplement to the Mishnah, organized in a similar
fashion and edited around 200 C.E.
14. TANAKH, A NEW TRANSLATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES 196 (The Jewish
Publication Society, 1985).
15. Leviticus 25:14.
16. Deuteronomy 25:13-16.
17. While the Mishnah states that many of these laws apply to both buyers and sellers,
most prohibitions are directed toward regulating sellers. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN,
Baba Metzia 4:4 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933).
18. EDWARD ZIPPERSTEIN, BUSINESS ETHICS IN JEWISH LAW 36 (1983).
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Mishnah, Tosefta, and the Talmud to regulate sellers.'9 The
rabbis presumed that sellers were in positions to use deceit,
falsehood, misrepresentation, or ambiguity to financially harm
consumers. Jewish law challenges the notion that the free
marketplace guarantees fair prices and eliminates fraud and
deceit.'
III. LACK OF PERFECT INFORMATION IN THE FREE MARKET
SYSTEM
Advocates of the free market system believe that "the
individual is a rational maximizer of satisfaction" and that the
market correctly rewards individual initiative.2 Many supporters
of unrestricted competition see Jews as role models of successful
private enterprise.' Their conclusions, however, focus on the
practices of Jews in largely non-Jewish environments and ignore
the abundant amount of Jewish source material that places
substantial restraints on the free market structure.23 Indeed,
Jewish law rejects the notion of a "free" marketplace and substan-
tially regulates prices, profits, competition, and sellers' practices.2'
Scholars continually debate whether the marketplace suffi-
ciently establishes fair price controls and prevents unreasonable
business practices.' Jewish law supports the implementation of
legislative guidelines to control the marketplace.26 Jewish law
questions the notion of "consumer sovereignty," which states that
producers automatically adjust to meet consumers' changing
preferences.27 The rabbis further challenge the assertion that a
"free market system 'gives people what they want instead of what
19. See HOROWITZ, supra note 12, at 1-3, 367.
20. LEO JUNG & AARON LEVINE, BUSINESS ETHICS IN JEWISH LAW 198 (1987).
21. CRANSTON, supra note 4, at 21.
22. See MEIR TAMARI, WITH ALL YOUR POSSESSIONS 1-2 (1987).
23. Id.
24. See infra section IV for a discussion of the specific details of these restrictions. For
a general discussion, see RICHARD HIRSCH, THE WAY OF THE UPRIGHT 63-92 (1973);
JUNG & LEVINE, supra note 20, at 224-51; TAMARI, supra note 22, at 83-125; Arthur Gross
Schaefer, Differing Concepts of Adequate Consideration from Common Law and Talmudic
Law: De Minimis Versus Equity, 2 NAT'L JEWISH L. REV. 79 (1987).
25. David A. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 284 (1986).
26. 3 JOHN MICKLEBURGH, CONSUMER PROTECTION 4 (1979).
27. BRIAN W. HARVEY, THE LAW OF CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FAIR TRADING
11(1978).
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a particular group thinks they ought to want.'" As suggested by
one contemporary Jewish scholar, the free enterprise system is not
free due to the following factors: "the manipulation of consumer
'needs' by advertising and merchandising techniques; the fostering
of a consumption-oriented life style bolstered by a psychology of
obsolescence and easy credit; the power and abuses of giant
corporations and conglomerates; and the political implications of
a military-industrial complex."'29
These factors undermine the underlying tenets of the free
market approach, which assume that consumers possess perfect
information and that price acts as an effective mechanism to reflect
consumer preferences.30
The theory that consumers possess perfect, or even adequate,
information about their business transactions assumes that
consumers have access to all relevant information and that the
information obtained can be reasonably understood.
New products incorporating modern technology can be so
complex that it is impossible for an ordinary consumer to make
any reasonable judgments regarding the quality of these prod-
ucts.31 Moreover, most of the information provided by the
manufacturers and retailers is provided by advertising agencies,
which are more concerned with selling the product than providing
consumers with useful information that would allow product
28. Id. at 11-12.
29. HIRSCH, supra note 24, at 63.
30. Id. See, e.g., W. Kip Vlscusl & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK:
CONSUMER AND WORKER RESPONSE TO HAZARD INFORMATION 83-97 (1987). The
notion persists that the "invisible hand" of consumer preferences will drive out seriously
defective products, though some studies support the contrary conclusion in certain markets.
For example, studies have shown that where quality is not easily observable, as in the
used-car market, price becomes merely a function of the product's outward appearance.
George Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons': Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). The result is that, without regulation, defective
products actually dominate such markets, driving out quality Id. Thus, regulatory
controls are necessary in such markets to provide producers with incentives to sell quality
goods. Id.; see also Richard L. Oliver & Russell S. Winer, A Framework for the Formation
and Structure of Consumer Expectations: Review and Propositions, 8 J. ECON. PSYCH. 469,
490-91 (1987) (stating that people make pessimistic predictions about product quality when
information is inadequate or unavailable).
31. Congress expressly acknowledges this complexity in the "findings and declaration
of purpose" of the Consumer Product Safety Act. See Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub.
L. No. 92-573, § 2(a), 86 Stat. 1207, § 2051(a)(2) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
2051-2084 (1994)).
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comparisons.' The agencies want consumer purchasing prefer-
ences to outweigh any negative information about the product.33
Finally, it is virtually impossible for any consumer to possess
all current and relevant information.34 Accordingly, in our
society, it is unreasonable to accept the general notion that
consumers possess the necessary information to make informed
decisions.3"
The most striking way in which the market theory diverges
from actual consumer practices is that the market theory presumes
that "price" is an accurate indicator, of consumer preference for
a particular product.36 Price, however, is often an inaccurate
indicator of consumer preference for a number of significant
reasons. First, many of the larger retailers and producers are able
to influence prices. 37 Second, a buyer may purchase an item out
of habit or may purchase a less attractive product at a higher price
due to the seller's reputation.38 Third, manufacturers' advertising,
guarantees, trade names, availability, and financing options cause
price to be only one of many factors consumers use to judge
whether or not to buy a particular product.39 Fourth, retailers
may charge exorbitant prices for a product with the intention of
increasing its attractiveness to a particular socio-economic
group.'
Additionally, the market theory has indirect detrimental
effects on consumers. For example, supply and demand do not
32. HARVEY, supra note 27, at 12.
33. Robert S. Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education
Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 159, 165 (1984).
Despite "truth in advertising" legislation, advertisers continue to find ways to minimize the
realities of dangerous products. See JEF I. RICHARDS, DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING:
BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF A LEGAL CONCEPT 48-50 (1990) (discussing the advertising
industry's "safe harbor" of deceptive, but unregulated, "nonfactual implied claims," e.g.,
advertisements that manipulate consumer anxieties).
34. Adler & Pittle, supra note 33, at 166. Some relevant information includes
warranty and guaranty terms, financing options, reputation of manufacturers, and future
availability of spare parts. RAMSAY, supra note 6, at 46.
35. See, e.g., Marlene Cimons, Poll Finds Birth Control Pill Risk Highly Overestimated,
L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 6, 1985, at 25 (citing a Gallup poll that shows that Americans greatly
overestimate the risks and underestimate the effectiveness of birth control pills).
36. ECONOMICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 10-11 (David Morris ed., 1980).
37. Id. at 12-16.
38. Id. at 13, 17-18.
39. Id. at 16-17.
40. See Nichola Zaklan, High Artistic Slick Advertising Campaigns Sell Luxury Vodka
to the Image Conscious - And They're Lapping it Up, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1989, at 34.
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sufficiently take into account the social and environmental costs to
society.4  Decisions to manufacture a particular product using
non-recyclable elements may have long-term environmental costs
that the price may not adequately reflect.42  Furthermore, con-
sumers possess different levels of individual knowledge and
sophistication. The professional buyer is more capable of judging
the multiplicity of factors when making a buying decision.43 The
affluent buyer can afford to acquire newspapers or buyer's guides
and can travel to various and distant locations for the best
products and the best prices." The less affluent buyer, on the
other hand, often has far fewer options.
4
Problems that exist in a free market system, such as disparate
market power and the lack of adequate or comprehensible
information, offer a basis for understanding the rabbis' rejection
of this system in favor of heavy regulation of market activities.
V. GENERAL DISCUSSION ON REGULATION
A. Movement Away From Regulation-Providing the Consumer
With More Information
In addition to arguing that self-regulation in the market-place
is insufficient to protect consumers, many critics have sharply
attacked the ability of legislation to accomplish the stated goal of
consumer protection. 46  The general criticism of consumer-
related legislation is that it fails to offer solutions that reflect
adequate research.47 Critics point to faulty assumptions or flawed
41. For example, the marketplace welcomed convenient disposable diapers, which are
not recyclable, thus filling up landfills and reducing the appeal of reusable regular diapers.
See, e.g., Washington Citizens for Recycling Foundation: Questions of Disposable Diaper
Recyclability Raised in Suit of Anderson, PR NEWSWIRE, June 29, 1992, cited in STEPHEN
BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 97-98
n.112 (1993).
42. See id.
43. ECONOMICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 36, at 16.
44. RAMSAY, supra note 6, at 50.
45. Id. Several price surveys indicate that identical products often sell for higher
prices in less affluent areas because consumers are unable to effectively compare prices
and are also unable to easily travel outside of their immediate areas. CRANSTON, supra
note 21, at 400.
46. James O'Grady, Consumer Remedies, 60 CAN. B. REV. 549, 561 (1982);
MIKELBURGH, supra note 26, at 4; CRANSTON, supra note 2, at 25.
47. BREYER, supra note 41, at 42.
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estimates upon which legislative solutions are sometimes based.4
Critics also contend that the legislature inadequately monitors the
effectiveness of consumer-based legislation. 49  Due to these
perceived shortcomings, critics hold that consumer legislation has
been ineffective.5 0
There are strong indications that consumers are harmed by
current consumer legislation.51 First, regulation is expensive for
consumers. Taxpayers must bear the high costs associated with
passing, implementing, and enforcing government consumer
protection laws. 52 Additionally, consumers ultimately pay for the
additional costs that are incurred by the business community for
compliance with relevant legal provisions.53 Finally, increased
costs of compliance may harm the overall United States economy
if American products cannot compete in overseas markets, where
product standards may be lower.' Reflecting on these increased
costs, one commentator speculated that consumer protection is a
luxury that the United States cannot afford in the world market
economy.55
Using a cost-benefit analysis to illustrate their point, those
opposing regulation reason that, unless the benefits of consumer
protection clearly outweigh all of its costs, consumer regulation is
inappropriate.56 This view supports the inclusion of an economic
48. Id. at 48.
49. See id. at 12-13 (citing the futility of mandating asbestos removal, based on the
belief that "undamaged white asbestos left in place is virtually harmless ... removal is
likely more dangerous than doing nothing"), 21-23 (stating that auto fuel-consumption
standards encourage manufacturers to market lighter, less crash-resistant cars, contributing
to hundreds of deaths per year).
50. Audiamur, The Menace of Consumerism, 131 SOLIC. J. 1173 (1987).
51. Id.
52. BREYER, supra note 41, at 13, 15, 17 (stating that the cost of asbestos removal
ranges from $53 to $150 billion; the cost of implementing benzene emission standards was
over $200 million; the cost of regulating transformers using PCB was $140 million).
53. HARVEY, supra note 27, at 22.
54. Id. This notion is weakened, however, when one observes that U.S. trading
partners also have product standards, so that eliminating United States standards may
actually put the United States in a worse trading position. See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman,
Japanese Product Standards as Non- Tariff Trade Barriers: When Regulatory Policy Becomes
a Trade Issue, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 389, 389 (1988).
55. Grether et al., supra note 25, at 287.
56. One scholar, perceiving that the public finds risk-benefit analysis a distasteful.
approach to public policy, offered as a solution the idea that public officials practice "a
little dissembling" when presenting their positions to the public. Steven E. Rhoads, How
Much Should We Spend to Save a Life, in VALUING LIFE: PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMAS 285,
305 (Steven E. Rhoads ed., 1980).
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analysis to indicate costs and benefits in any proposed regulation
or agency action.' Rather than attempting to institute a particu-
lar policy based on generally perceived needs or notions of
"fairness," statistical evidence could clearly demonstrate the
effectiveness of proposed solutions, and the costs to manufacturers
as well as to consumers." As one author recently wrote:
Expenditure on consumer protection has to be met from some-
where and in order to justify it we must be able to show that
the net benefits to society as a whole of such activity are greater
than the net benefits to society from allocating the resources
elsewhere. At the very least we should be able to show that the
net benefit is positive, that is, that the value of consumer
protection activity to society exceeds its resource cost.59
While these scholars find ethically-based regulatory standards
to be too restrictive on business, others consider the regulatory
mechanism to be too lax. These critics focus on the weak
authority given to the various governmental agencies charged with
enforcing the consumer protection laws. The effectiveness of
consumer protection legislation is directly tied to the effectiveness
of enforcement agencies.6 Presently, consumer agencies are not
sufficiently staffed, and their resources are severely limited.61
Consequently, consumer agencies are unable to police violations
57. Timothy J. Muris, The Consumer Protection Mission: Guiding Principles and
Future Direction, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 628 (1982). Cost-benefit analysis is not the norm
in court remedy decisions because courts reject the economic view that the optimal level
of harmful negligence can be greater than zero. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, REMEDIES 607, 612
(1985). Federal consumer protection legislation, however, often requires a cost-benefit
approach. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 11930) (1988) (the Flammable Fabrics Act); 15 U.S.C. §
2058(f) (1988) (the Consumer Product Safety Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1262(i) (1988) (the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act). See also James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal
Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
265, 271-72 (1990) (asserting that the risk-benefit test is fast becoming the primary theme
in design defect laws nationwide).
58. Muns, supra note 57, at 628. It is difficult to construct a cost-benefit analysis of
this nature where the exact risk is hard to measure, the population affected is
unknowledgeable, and the long-term damages are unforeseeable; it is a heavy burden on
those who would bring claims to court. See Gulf South Insulation v. U.S. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that product safety regulation would
only be enforced if the total harm outweighed the benefit that the product provided). In
Gulf South Insulation, plaintiff showed that the use of urea-formaldehyde foam insulation
caused acute irritant effects, including cancer, but failed to demonstrate the likelihood of
the occurrence of acute symptoms, thus failing to demonstrate a net harm.
59. ECONOMICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 36, at xi.
60. Ross CRANSTON, REGULATING BUSINESS 168 (1979).
61. Id.
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and often favor negotiated settlements, or mere advisory action,
without fully pursuing civil and criminal remedies.62 While
negotiated settlements may resolve individual complaints, they
generally do not have a deterrent effect on unsafe commercial
practices.63 Thus, the agencies appear ineffective and are unable
to substantially impact the behavior of manufacturers and
producers.' In addition, several authorities note that consumer
agencies often develop a close working relationship with those
businesses they monitor.65 Some agencies tend to support the
industries they are regulating and cease to represent the communi-
ty's interest in product safety.'
Increasing the quantity of legislation in order to protect
consumers also raises concerns about the disproportionate cost of
regulation on the poor and the movement toward a planned,
centralized economy. Because consumers ultimately pay the bill
for costs associated with consumer protection, critics argue that the
cost of consumer protection works to the detriment of the poor
and may even price certain products beyond their means.67
Furthermore, critics contend that increased consumer protection
could require excessive governmental intervention, which is
characteristic of a planned, centralized economy.'
Clearly, those who worry about too much government control
of the U.S. economy might view increased consumer protection as
a dangerous intrusion into the free market system. Rather than
regulate, some critics argue that the "government should inform
and educate the public about the risks associated with various
hazards and let individuals choose whether or not to take the
risks." 69
62. Several agencies believe that compliance with consumer laws can be achieved more
efficiently by advice and persuasion rather than by threats and court proceedings. Id. at
168-69.
63. Id. at 170.
64. According to a recent survey, forty percent of respondents trust non-governmental
groups more than they trust the federal government to ensure that the food they eat is
consumable. Wirthlin Poll, Mar. 1994, para. 1, available in WESTLAW, Poll Library.
65. See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1335, 1346 (1993) (discussing the bribery scandal at the FDA in the late
1980's).
66. CRANSTON, supra note 2, at 406. See CRANSTON, supra note 60, at 3, 30, 169.
67. CRANSTON, supra note 2, at 4.
68. HARVEY, supra note 27, at 20.
69. Adler & Pittle, supra note 33, at 159-60.
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B. Argument in Favor of Information Rather Than Regulation
The basic presumption that supports increased information
over additional regulation is the belief that consumers are "astute
enough to be able to make their own decisions if they can be
provided with sufficient accurate information."7  Providing
consumers with warning labels, nutritional information, and other
useful information does not impose an unreasonable burden on, or
create a significant cost to, either manufacturers or consumers.71
While there is some concern that product information can
cause confusion,72 other scholars assert that there is no proof
showing that excess information is harmful.73  These same
scholars contend that, although consumers may become frustrated
with excessive information, this does not mean that the consumer
will make the "wrong" purchase decision.74 Furthermore, these
scholars assert that consumers want more information on which to
base their choices, regardless of whether consumers actually use all
of the available information.75
Many people believe that providing more information is the
most cost-effective way to help consumers because it bypasses the
need for agency regulation.76 Substantial savings can be realized
by reducing the need for regulatory agencies.77 Conversely, very
70. O'Grady, supra note 46, at 551.
71. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 57, at 297.
72. Id. at 296-97 (stating that too many warnings lead to both higher accident costs
because some consumers come to ignore or discount warnings, and to excessive loss of
business because some consumers will overreact to warnings of even very remote risks).
73. Grether et al., supra note 25, at 278, 284-85.
74. Id. at 285.
75. Id. Consumers attempt to use whatever product information is available to them.
A recent poll showed eighty-six percent of respondents read the nutrition label, at least
occasionally, the first time they buy products, and seventy-five percent of the respondents
stated that this information influences their buying decisions. Wirthlin Group Poll, Apr.-
May 1993, para. 1, available in WESTLAW, Poll Library.
76. Grether et al., supra note 25, at 287-88.
77. Id. at 287. Informational requirements such as labeling are useful when consumers
perceive a risk that the government considers negligible or nonexistent. An example of
this situation is the recent controversy over irradiated foods. Sixty-eight percent of
respondents in a recent survey believed that irradiated food is a health hazard. Opinion
Research Poll, Jan.-Feb. 1994, para. 1, available in WESTLAW, Poll Library. A public
outcry might have resulted if the government had ignored this widespread perception;
agriculture would have suffered substantial losses if the government had banned
irradiation. Thus, the decision to simply label such food was an efficient and inexpensive
solution.
1994]
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little cost is added to the retail price of the product as a result of
increased disclosure requirements.7' Additionally, educational
programs limit government involvement in the economy, preserve
individual choice, and do not overburden American manufacturers
who need to remain free to effectively compete in the world
market.79  Finally, those who favor more education argue that
regulation is incapable of preventing all injuries or deceptive
practices.80
C. Movement Toward Regulation and Away From Simply
Providing More Information
Proponents of regulation argue that "the complexities of the
market are now beyond the grasp of any individual consumers
[sic]. '81  Some proponents believe that businesses need outside
regulation because they resist self-regulatory measures that will
control their actions and have adverse effects on their own
interests.' Some proponents believe that self-regulation only
78. Grether, et al., supra note 25, at 287.
79. Adler & Pittle, supra note 33, at 159-60.
80. Id. at 160.
81. O'Grady, supra note 12, at 551.
82. CRANSTON, supra note 60, at 4. The tobacco industry provides a clear example
of the need for outside regulation. See, e.g., THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE, THE TAX BURDEN
ON TOBACCO at iii (1988) (giving examples of the benefits society reaps because the
tobacco industry is heavily taxed); UNITED STATES DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER AND CHRONIC LUNG
DISEASE IN THE WORKPLACE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1985); UNITED
STATES DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
INVOLUNTARY SMOKING - A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1986) (reporting
results of research concerning third-party smokers); UNITED STATES DEPT. OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE
ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988) (declaring the nicotine found
in cigarettes is as addictive as heroin).
A regulatory compliance defense permits the tobacco industry to continue to legally
sell their products; the federal regulation of tobacco specifically provides that, as long as
tobacco is properly labeled, it is effectively immune from tort action. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. i (1977) (stating that the extent to which one assesses
whether tobacco has a product defect will only be with respect to whether it is "good"
tobacco or tainted tobacco). Federal Cigarette Labelling & Advertising Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1988)). Tobacco
may eventually be regulated as an addictive drug if great consumer pressure encourages
Congress to take action. James T. O'Reilly, A Consistent Ethic of Safety Regulation: The
Case for Improving Regulation of Tobacco Products, 3 ADMIN. LJ. 215, 253 (1989).
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works when businesses are threatened with government regulation
or legal action.83
Arguments in support of regulation also incorporate the
concept that the market system does not adequately reward
producers that are concerned about the environment or safety
issues.' Often, it is less expensive to manufacture new products
than to use recycled products; it is easy to ignore the possible
consequences the production process may have on the environ-
ment.
Although some manufacturers emphasize the safety features
of their products, marketing surveys suggest that "safety" does not
sell.s5 "While consumers will often avoid products they believe
to be unsafe, they will rarely go out of their way to seek goods
reputed to be particularly safe." 6 Advocates of regulation assert
that safety and environmental concerns can only be effectively
advanced through government intervention.
Another argument in support of government regulation
contends that, because people expect the government to ensure the
fairness of the marketplace, the government must fulfill this
expectation.' Thus, consumers that are at the greatest disadvan-
tage- the ill, elderly, or poor-are in the most need of legislative
protection. This argument operates on the premise that a moral
society should protect the most vulnerable members of society.,1
Another argument in favor of regulation contends that even
moral businesses make unethical decisions due to the pressure to
make profits.89 The profit expectations placed on businesses are
83. CRANSTON, supra note 2, at 399.
84. See supra text accompanying note 30 for a discussion of the inadequacy of the free
market system.
85. Adler & Pittle, supra note 33, at 163.
86. id.
87. For a discussion on the need to legislate fair business practices, see supra notes 81-
83.
88. Id.
89. The long-term potential damage of a defective product in the marketplace is often
outweighed, in the corporate world, by the potential for short-term profit. For example,
over two million women in the United States have received breast implants, most of which
are silicone gel implants manufactured by Dow Coming Corporation. James F. Johnson,
American Briefing, 14 PROD. LIAB. INT'L 5 (1992). In 1992, a federal jury awarded $7.34
million, including $6.5 million in punitive damages, to a woman whose silicone breast
implant had ruptured. Id. The jury found that the implant was designed and manufac-
tured defectively, that the manufacturer, Dow Coming, had failed to warn women of the
risks of the device, had breached its warranty, and had committed fraud. Id. Dow
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so oppressive that they are unable or unwilling to make decisions
that might reduce profits.' ° Profitability is their primary motive
to the exclusion of almost all other considerations.9' Regulation
is necessary because it will force corporations to act responsibly
despite the overpowering pressures on them to make a profit at
any and all costs.92
Furthermore, courts often interpret consumer legislation
according to the strict standard used in reviewing criminal laws
rather than the more lenient interpretation allowed in civil law.93
While some courts may protect consumers from boiler plate
contracts, generally a consumer will be bound to the terms of the
signed contract.' It is often irrelevant to the court that the
contract may be a standard form, provided by the seller, containing
unfavorable terms for the consumer.' Thus, many consumers
have no ability to effectively protect themselves and must
therefore rely on government intervention.
Coming has since become the subject of immense litigation; approximately 11,800 lawsuits
are currently pending against Dow Coming as of January 20, 1994, many involving
multiple plaintiffs. As a result, Dow Coming has suffered falling share prices, loss of
consumer confidence, and bad publicity. Report Worldwide, 14 PRODUCT LIABILrrY INT'L
6 (1992); Dow Corning Corporation disclosure statement, Dec. 31, 1993, at 7, available in
LEXIS, Company database, Company file, "U.S. Co. Profiles" Group. Moreover, on
September 1, 1994, Dow Coming agreed to pay $2 billion of a $4.25 billion settlement
between women and breast implant makers. Judge Oks $4.25 Billion Implant Pact, PRESS-
TELEGRAM (Long Beach), Sept. 2, 1994, at Al. This settlement is the largest product
liability settlement in U.S. history. Id.
90. An illustration drawn from bankruptcy law demonstrates the counter-productivity
of this focus on profit. Product liability for unknown risks does not increase the average
amount of research in a particular industry, but it does reduce the number of firms in that
market. Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 698-705 (1985). In
other words, where the investment required for product safety may be considerable, some
firms will go bankrupt rather than try to ensure that the product they sell is safe. Id. This
situation reveals the self-defeating effect of corporate aversion to increasing safety
research. Id.
91. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (involving the decision
of Ford executives to forgo a safety measure that, at a cost of two to ten dollars per car,
would have eliminated the tendency of the 1972 Pinto's fuel tank to explode on impact).
92. CRANSTON, supra note 2, at 21.
93. Id.
94. Sheean v. Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1987).
95. Powers v. Detroit Auto. Ins. Exch., 398 N.W.2d 411, 432 (1986).
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D. Movement Away From Information As a Preference Over
Regulation
Informational programs are popular because of their cost
efficiency and limited government involvement in the private
sector. Many critics argue, however, that informational programs
do not improve the consumer's ability to make informed buying
decisions.' Moreover, there is no guarantee that better-informed
consumers will actually change their buying behavior. Information
rarely encourages consumers to adopt new buying patterns.97
Furthermore, consumer protection should attempt to assist the
most vulnerable consumers. Increased information will not meet
this goal. Educational campaigns in lower socio-economic groups
have limited effectiveness.98  Consumers in less affluent areas
appear to be "less influenced by information and educational
messages."'  These consumers, and many others,-do not read or
understand warning and nutrition labels."° Excessive informa-
tion can divert the consumer from finding and understanding truly
significant information." 1 Accordingly, the best way to protect
these consumers is through government regulation. This goal is
consistent with Jewish law, which emphasizes heavy regulation of
the marketplace.
VI. JEWISH REGULATIONS OF THE MARKETPLACE
While Jewish sources may hold differing points of view
regarding specific regulations, all sources underscore the need for
control of the marketplace. The Jewish system does not set forth
generally accepted rules of law; rather, much of Jewish law takes
the form of a discussion that includes minority and majority
opinions. Regardless of the source used, however, Jewish law
clearly asserts the need for regulation of the market system
through legislation rather than through private law or additional
consumer information.
96. Adler & Pittle, supra note 33, at 159-60.
97. Id. at 163.
98. Id. at 167.
99. Id.; RAMSAY, supra note 6, at 50, 70.
100. Adler & Pittle, supra note 33, at 165. Over 40% of consumers do not read
warning labels. Grether et al., supra note 25, at 284 n.13.
101. See, e.g., supra note 72; Grether et al., supra note 25, at 277.
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A. Regulations to Ensure Fair Comparison Shopping
While Jewish law provides consumers with legal recourse in
the event of misrepresentation, 1°2 the Mishnah provides detailed
regulations that prohibit merchants from deceiving buyers through
intentional or unintentional misrepresentation."°3 The Mishnah
prohibits mixing old and new produce or mixing different types of
produce because merchants may hide old produce within new,
hoping that consumers will not be able to tell the difference.1"
Moreover, one cannot mix the new produce of one field with the
new produce of another field, as one may only want to buy
produce from a certain field that is known to have a better
quality.105
The Tosefta expands the Mishnah's prohibitions by restricting
the mixing of wines: "And they do not commingle wine, not new
with new, or old with old, and it goes without saying, new with old
or old with new, or strong with weak."' 6
According to the Tosefta, Rabbi Judah allows strong wines to
be mixed with weak wines if the mixture will improve the strong
wine." Although Rabbi Judah is often overruled by other
rabbis, his teachings provide insight into the rabbinic mind.
Rather than presenting a single solution to a particular problem,
the rabbis also present minority views to teach important lessons.
Accordingly, Rabbi Judah states "if there are two types [of wine]
which improve one another, [mixing them is] prohibited."" The
102. In the case of innocent misrepresentation, U.S. courts will give redress to a party
who is injured by reasonably relying on the statement of another. The Mishnah set forth
a similar remedy in a case involving a man who sold grain and mistakenly said that it was
"garden seed." THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Bathra 6:1 (Herbert Danby trans.,
1933). According to the Mishnah, the person making the false representation is held
accountable if the grain does not "spring up." Id. In Jewish law, a person will be held
liable for statements that are later found to be false. There is no legal requirement that
a misrepresentation must be intentional. The only requirement is that the statement,
which was made and relied upon, was false. The Mishnah illustrates this point in the case
of a man leasing an "irrigated field." THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 9:2
(Herbert Danby trans., 1933). If it turns out that the spring dries up and the field is no
longer "irrigated," then the person making the representation will not be entitled to full
rent. Id.
103. See generally THE MISHNAH, supra note 14.
104. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:11 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933).
105. HANoCH ALBECK, THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:11,83 (1930).
106. THE TOSEFrA, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Mesia 3:26 (Jacob Neusner ed., 1981).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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majority view, however, allows the seller to mix strong wine with
mild wine "since this improves it."" Rabbi Judah sets forth the
general proposition that consumers need absolute protection from
potential abuses while other rabbis are not as concerned if wine is
mixed for a valid reason. Both the Mishnah and the Tosefta state
that an individual seller may not mix the lees (the sediment or
dregs)" of one barrel of wine with the lees of another."'
These regulations prohibit the mixing of products, fearing that
buyers may be deceived because they will not be able to tell
exactly what they are buying.
The rabbis are not as concerned if goods are mixed when the
consumer is fully aware that the goods have been mixed."' The
rabbis do not consider this practice deceptive, and the merchant
may sell a mixed product."3 In addition, a merchant can sell
adulterated wine if this fact is made known to the customer, and
if it is the local custom."4 Where buyers are aware of local
customs, the Mishnah presumes no deception exists. 5 The
Mishnah, however, prohibits the selling of mixed produce or
adulterated wine to a merchant, even if the merchant is informed
of the mixture, because of a concern that this sale may ultimately
lead to deception."' If a merchant buys articles and produce for
resale, the merchant could resell the merchandise without
disclosing that it is mixed." 7
Although merchants cannot combine merchandise, the
Mishnah generally allows wholesalers to buy produce from a
109. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:11 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933);
TEXT OF THE TALMUD 95 n.30 (Hyman E. Goldin trans., 1933) (based on Rashi to
Gemara 60a) [hereinafter Goldin]. Goldin suggests that the vendor can mix strong wine
with mild only if an agreement calls for mild wine, but the vendor cannot mix strong with
mild wine if the agreement calls for strong wine.
110. MISHNAYOTH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:11, 119 (Philip Blackman ed., 2d
ed. 1990) [hereinafter Blackman].
111. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:11 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933);
THE TOSEFTA, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Mesia 3:26 (Jacob Neuser ed., 1981).
112. THE TOSEFTA, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Mesia 3:27 (Jacob Neusner ed., 1981);
Goldin, supra note 109, at 95 nn.31-32.
113. Goldin, supra note 109, at 95 nn.31-32; THE TOSEFTA, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba
Mesia 3:27 (Jacob Neusner ed., 1981).
114. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Mezia 4:11 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933).
115. Blackman, supra note 110, at 119 n.5.
116. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:11 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933);
see also ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 18, at 36.
117. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 18, at 36.
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variety of sources and recognizes that keeping this merchandise
separate would be an unreasonable burden."' Furthermore,
consumers know that merchants buy from various dealers" 9 and
that they often store large quantities in a single large cask. 20
Accordingly, the Mishnah states that a "merchant may buy from
five threshing-floors and put the produce into a single store-
chamber., 121  Nevertheless, the Mishnah continues to be con-
cerned about deception and allows the merchant to mix produce
on the condition that "there was no intention to mix them for
purpose of fraud."' 22 A merchant would not be allowed to mix
good and bad produce because the intent seems deceptive.123
The Mishnah expresses its concern over deception through
discussion of the sifting of beans.124  Although the majority of
rabbis allow the merchant to sift out small stones and other debris,
a merchant "must not sift the beans only from the top of the bin,
because this tends to deceive the eye [of the purchaser]." 25 The
concern of the Mishnah is that the consumer may assume that the
entire bin contains sifted beans when it does not. Furthermore,
while there is a market value for unsifted beans, there is no fixed
market price for sifted beans.126  Although a merchant could
charge more for beans that are separated from waste, the customer
would be unable to compare the value of the sifted beans to the
market price. 27 Therefore, sifting beans could lead to decep-
tion. 12" Consequently, the sages permit only a limited amount of
sifting on the top of a bin so the buyer can know the quality of the
sifted beans.'29 The rationale of the Mishnah is that a buyer
should be able to compare the prices of similar products in a
comparable state of preparation.
118. Id.
119. Goldin, supra note 109, at 96 n.32.
120. Id. at 96. For a description of the type of "cask" mentioned in the Mishnah, see
THE MISHNAH, SEDER MOED, Rosh Hashannah 3:7 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933).
121. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:12 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933).
122. Id.
123. Blackman, supra note 110, at 119.
124. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:12 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933).
125. Goldin, supra note 109, at 97.
126. Id. at 96-97 n.35; see also ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 18, at 37.
127. Goldin, supra note 109, at 96-97.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 97 n.35.
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B. Regulation of Deceptive Practices
The Mishnah states: "One may not give a deceptive appear-
ance to a human being, or cattle, or implements.' 130  A human
being's appearance should not be embellished by dying one's
hair.'31 A cow's appearance should not be altered by drugs that
raise and stiffen its hair.'32 Implements should not be made to
look better by painting them.'33 The Tosefta adds that one
cannot put meat in water to increase its sale weight. 3 4  The
Mishnah and the Tosefta clearly set forth the concept that a seller
is under a duty to present the true appearance of merchandise.'35
The seller has a duty to disclose to the buyer any blemish or defect
in the object of sale.
13 6
C. Regulations on Unfair Competition
In addition to deceptive practices, unfair competition is
discussed in the Mishnah. For example, Rabbi Judah discourages
shopkeepers from giving out "parched corn [popcorn] or nuts to
children."'37  He is concerned that the children will become
accustomed to buying merchandise at the place where the
shopkeeper gives out treats.138 Further, he states that merchants
engage in non-price competition such as giving gifts to custom-
ers.139  This type of competition may confuse consumers and
induce them to buy products for reasons other than price or
quality. The majority of the rabbis disagree with this approach.
Apparently, they believe that gift-giving an appropriate practice
because it creates a warm and inviting atmosphere."
The approaches of Rabbi Judah and the other rabbis are
consistent if they are understood to apply in different circumstanc-
es. Rabbi Judah's prohibition should only be applied when a
130. Blackman, supra note 110, at 120.
131. Id. at 120 n.8.
132. Goldin, supra note 109, at 97 n.36.
133. Id.
134. THE TOSEFA, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 3:29 (Jacob Neuser ed., 1981).
135. Zipperstein, supra note 18, at 35.
136. Id. at 37.
137. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:12 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933).
138. Blackman, supra note 110, at 120.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 120 n.4.
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practice stifles competition by inducing the buyer to purchase
goods from a particular retailer.
Rabbi Judah prohibits shopkeepers from lowering prices to
attract customers.' He worries that sales can be specifically
timed and aimed to hurt a particular competitor.14 2 Again, the
majority of rabbis during the time of the Mishnah disregarded
Rabbi Judah's anxieties and allowed such practices.143 The sages
even praise a person who lowers prices by stating that "he is to be
remembered for good."'" The Sages, aware of the benefits of
competition, do not want to stop merchants from earning profits
and competing effectively.45
Once again, Rabbi Judah's pronouncement does not conflict
with the views of the other rabbis. Rabbi Judah's ruling is directed
at stronger merchants who are able to force others out of business
by the use of "predatory pricing,"'" while the majority of rabbis
favor sales that benefit the consumer when there is no attempt to
impede competition.
D. Regulation of Fair Prices for Consumer Products
Jewish law rejects the self-regulating market model as an
effective method to ensure fair prices. 47 Jewish law attempts to
ensure a "fair" deal by limiting profits to less than one-sixth of the
purchase price.'" This limitation on profits does not cover all
transactions. The Mishnah specifically excludes slaves,'49 bonds
141. Id. at 120 n.5.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 18, at 37.
146. Predatory pricing occurs when competitors cannot match the reduced price and
consequently fail in their business.
147. Tamari, supra note 22, at 87.
148. "Ona'ah" takes place when a merchant charges "four pieces of silver out of the
twenty-four pieces of silver that make up sela, or one-sixth of the purchase-price .... "
THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:3 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933). Although
the actual weight of a sela, relative to modern standards, is not known, it is believed that
a sela would be approximately 14.4 grams. Blackman, supra note 112, Zeraim at 18-24.
While the term ona'ah is most commonly translated as "fraud" or "overreaching," the
usage of this term in Jewish law carries no suggestion of an attempt to "intentionally" take
advantage of another person. See ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 18, at 29. Rather the
"overcharge" is viewed simply as a mistake without a declaration of evil intent.
149. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:9 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933).
There are many references to slaves being a part of the Palestinian economy. See, e.g.,
THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Bathra 4:7 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933); THE
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of indebtedness,15 real estate,51 and anything belonging to the
Temple.15 2  The general rationale'53 for these exclusions is that
the items are unique because they are not interchangeable,"s or
have unlimited lives.155  Eventually, the rules of overcharging
applied only to basic necessities with a ready market value.'56
Because fair price is an important and essential element of
any agreement, the communities established and enforced just
prices through the use of market commissioners. 57  Regulations
adopted by these commissioners attempted to prevent unscrupu-
lous practices such as a situation where an unethical merchant
withholds his goods until the bulk of a product has been sold and
then raises his prices."'58
E. Regulation on Fair Weights and Measures
The Bible specifically directs the instruments used for business
transactions must be accurate: "You shall not have in your pouch
a weight and a weights-a large one and a small one. And you
shall not have in your house a measure and a measure-a large
one and a small one. A perfect and honest weight shall you have,
a perfect and honest measure shall you have ....
The Bible and the Talmud repeatedly warn merchants to have
accurate weights and measures.' 6° Within this context, the rabbis
understood the necessity of establishing local rules that may differ
MISHNAH, SEDER NASHIM, Kiddushin 1:3 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933); BABYLONIAN
TALMUD, SEDER MO'ED III, Yoma 35b (I. Epstein trans., 1935); BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
SEDER NASHIM 1, Yebamot 48b (I. Epstein trans., 1935); BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SEDER
NASHIM IV, Gitten 40a (I. Epstein trans., 1935). There are no grounds, however, for
thinking that the agricultural economy of Jewish Palestine was based on slave labor to any
great extent or that the slave trade was a major source of profits. See GEDALIAH ALON,
THE JEWS IN THEIR LAND IN THE TALMUDIC AGE 160 (Gershan Levi trans., 1980).
150. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:9 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933).
151. Id. For a discussion of the strong Jewish tradition of clinging to the land of one's
ancestors, see ALON, supra note 149, at 156-68.
152. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 4:9 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933).
153. For a more detailed discussion, see Schaefer, supra note 24, at 89-91.
154. 2 ISAAC HERZOG, THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW 122-23 (1967).
155. See Blackman, supra note 110, at 118 n.1.
156. HIRSCH, supra note 24, at 69.
157. Id.
158. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SEDER NEZIKIN II, Baba Bathra 90b (I. Epstein trans.,
1935); Tamari, supra note 22, at 90.
159. Deuteronomy 25:13-15.
160. Leviticus 19:35-36; Proverbs 11:1; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SEDER NEZIKIN II, Baba
Bathra 88a, 88b, 89b (I. Epstein trans., 1935).
19941
Loy. L.A. Int7 & Comp. L.J.
from the universal standards. As the Talmud stated, "the exact
weight must not be given where the practice is to allow over-
weight, and that overweight must not be allowed where the
practice is to give the exact weight." '61
E Regulation of Verbal Indiscretions and the Legislation of
Morality in the Marketplace
Although verbal indiscretions may not be punishable, "the
Rabbis considered such actions contrary to ethics and moral
norms."'62  The Mishnayoth states: "Just as there is [fraud by]
overreaching in buying and selling, so there is wrong done by
words." '163 The Tosefta adds: "Just as a claim of fraud applies to
buying and selling, so a claim of fraud applies to spoken
words."'" Accordingly, traditional Jewish sources sound a
warning about the power of words: "Thus, one may not say to
another, "What is the price of this thing?' if he do [sic] not wish
to purchase it.' 65 This passage suggests that it is unfair to take
the merchant's time if there is no real possibility of a sale; the
merchant could spend time with other customers who may make
a purchase. In addition, merchants may expect a sale when a
consumer asks for a price. The rabbis considered it unfair to
increase the merchant's expectations when the consumer, in fact,
never intended to purchase the item." The rabbis expressed
their concern for speaking carefully with regard to financial
matters and many other areas of personal interaction.167  Thus,
161. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SEDER NEZIKIN II, Baba Bathra 89a (I. Epstein trans.,
1935).
162. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 18, at 35.
163. Blackman, supra note 110, at 118.
164. THE TOSEFrA, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 3:25 (Jacob Neusner ed., 1981).
165. Blackman, supra note 110, at 118.
166. Id.
167. The Mishnah also warns against reminding a person of former improper deeds.
If a person is not allowed to forget the past, then that person may believe that there is no
benefit to self-improvement. Albeck, supra note 107, at 83; Blackman, supra note 110, at
118-19. The Mishnah also deals with converts in this manner. The Mishnah states: "If a
man was descended from proselytes, they may not say to him, 'Remember the deeds of
thy forefathers."' Id. at 119. "And a stranger shalt thou not wrong, neither shalt thou
oppress him." Exodus 22:21. The Tosefta provides more detail as to what should not be
said: "[If] one saw a proselyte come to study Torah, he should not say to him, 'Look who's
coming to study Torah-this one who ate carrion and teref- meat, abominations and
creeping things."' THE TOSEFrA, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Metzia 3:25 (Jacob Neusner
trans., 1981). The Tosefta warns of additional situations when people can be oppressed
by words: "[If] there were ass-drivers seeking [to buy] wine and oil, one should not say to
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these passages demonstrate the rabbis' attempts to take into
account the feelings of others when prescribing moral actions.
VII. GENERAL DISCUSSION ON ACHIEVING THE GOALS AND
VALUES OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
A. Some Basic Assumptions of Consumer Protection
Consumer protection laws reflect more than a socio-political
decision. Legislation of the marketplace reflects moral and
religious ethics, which presume disproportionate bargaining power
between sellers and buyers.1" Jewish law clearly suggests the
need for controls over the activities of sellers, who are generally
believed to be in a stronger bargaining position69 Today's
advocates of consumer protection agree that "[a] completely
unregulated laissez-faire system is unacceptable . . ." because the
strong will necessarily dominate the weak. 70 Therefore, most
proponents support pragmatic regulations that redress the
perceived inequality of bargaining power and increase information
to benefit consumers. Their goal is to reduce the ability of the
manufacturers and retailers to manipulate consumers, thus assisting
consumers in making prudent decisions.7 1  Proponents also aim
to provide consumers with the ability to enter into fair bargains
rather than ones that place consumers at a disadvantage172
The biblical directive that the disadvantaged need additional
protection underscores the perceived inequality between the buyer
and the seller. 173 Some current scholars consider the poor to be
at a disadvantage, evidenced by the fact that less affluent individu-
them, 'Go to So-and-so,'-who has never [previously] sold wine or oil. If there was a
sickness and it came upon someone or it came upon his [child] and he buried his son, one
should not say to him in the manner that Job's friends spoke to him: 'Is not your fear of
G-d your confidence, and the integrity of your ways your hope? Think now, who that was
innocent ever perished? Or where were the upright cut off?' (Job 4:6-7)." THE TOSEFTA,
Seder Nezikin, Baba Metzia 3:25 (Jacob Neusner trans., 1981).
168. Tamari, supra note 22, at 49, 88; ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 18, at 30.
169. Tamari, supra note 22, at 49, 88; ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 18, at 30.
170. HARVEY, supra note 27, at 18.
171. CRANSTON, supra note 2, at 4.
172. "[Tjhere has been a growing recognition that the individual, even in a free and
competitive economy, lacks an awareness of the available alternative methods of financing
acquisitions, has insufficient expertise to choose between [various alternatives], and in any
event is in an inferior bargaining position which forces him into disadvantageous
transactions." MICKLEBURGH, supra note 26, at 3.
173. Deuteronomy 10:18; Jeremiah 7:6; Zechariah 7:10.
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als generally pay more for what they consume 174 and tend to be
less aware of their rights. 175 Reports have demonstrated that
questionable marketing techniques more effectively manipulate less
affluent consumers than the general population. 76 The poor are
less informed about prices, less informed about costs of credit and
product variations, and pay more for what they buy.'" Thus,
consumer protection legislation is often supported because it is
designed to help the economically and socially disadvantaged
members of our society.1
78
Jewish sources state that the regular remedies for misrepresen-
tation and other private redresses are insufficient. The multiplicity
and detail of the laws found in the Talmud and the Mishnah
clearly articulate the need for government regulation of the
private sector. Modem consumer advocates echo this belief.
17 9
Many consumers are ignorant of their legal rights, lack the
assertiveness to complain, and are generally unwilling or unable to
pursue legal remedies."a  Secure in the knowledge that few
consumers will pursue the matter, some businesses feel that they
can produce defective products and engage in unfair business
practices.'81 Government regulation may be the only way to
guarantee that consumers will be protected. 1 2
Unfair business practices are hardly a new phenomenon, with
roots as old as human nature. As the father of the great American
jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., stated over one hundred years
ago:
When legislators keep the law,
When banks dispense with bolts and locks,
174. CRANSTON, supra note 2, at 4.
175. Typically white, middle-class individuals most often complain to consumer agencies
or take legal action to protect their consumer rights. Consumer Reports and other
consumer-focused publications have readerships from the white middle class. Id. at 6.
176. CRANSTON, supra note 2, at 5.
177. Id. at 4.
178. See generally CRANSTON, supra note 2, at 3-4.
179. Id.
180. Many national surveys conclude that most consumers who have experienced
problems fail to complain due to a lack of a rudimentary knowledge of their legal rights.
Id. at 23.
181. "It appears clear that certain businesses find it acceptable to commit a number of
consumer offenses instead of changing their trade practices...." Fines and legal expenses
can just be viewed as another expense of doing business. CRANSTON, supra note 60, at 8.
For examples of this view, see supra text accompanying notes 84, 89.
182. CRANSTON, supra note 2, at 3.
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When berries, whortle- rasp- and straw-
Grow bigger downwards through the box,
When he that selleth house or land
Shows leak in roof or flaw in right,
When haberdashers choose the stand
Whose window hath the broadest light,
When preachers tell us all they think,
And party leaders all they mean,
When what we pay for, that we drink,
From real grape and coffee-bean,
When lawyers take what they would give,
And doctors give what they would take,
When city fathers eat to live,
Save when they fast for conscience' sake,
When one that hath a horse on sale
Shall bring his merit to the proof,
Without a lie for every nail
That holds the iron on the hoof,
Till then let Cumming blaze away,
And Miller's saints blow up the globe;183
But when you see that blessed day,
Then order your ascension robe!
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.1
4
Jewish tradition presumes the need to create a moral and fair
market system without regard to economic costs and benefits. In
fact, Jewish sources never refer to the economic costs of consumer
protection as being more significant than the overall functioning of
such a system. Moreover, Jewish law rejects some of the basic
assumptions supporting the cost-benefit analysis that is currently
popular. Cost-benefit analysis is necessarily classified as a
utilitarian system, which focuses on the needs of the majority. 5
183. John Cumming and William Miller, popular 19th-century preachers who claimed
that the millenium had arrived. See 5 DICTIONARY OF NAT'L BIOGRAPHY 297,297 (Leslie
Stephen & Sidney Lee eds., 1917); 6 DICTIONARY OF AM. BIOGRAPHY 641, 642 (Dumas
Malone ed., 1933).
184. Oliver W. Holmes, Sr., Latter-Day Warnings, in THE AUTOCRAT OF THE
BREAKFAST-TABLE 24, 24-25 (Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1892) (1858).
185. Bill Shaw & Art Wolfe, A Legal and Ethical Critique of Using Cost-Benefit
Analysis in Public Law, 19 Hous. L. REV. 899, 903 (1982). See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &
NORMAN E. BOWIE, ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 21 (1983) ("This theory is rooted
in the thesis that an action or practice is right when compared to any alternative action or
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In this regard, Jewish law is often characterized as a
deontological1" system, which focuses on affirming its principles
rather then supporting the majority's best interests. 187  For
example, Jewish tradition views an individual as a unique creation
of G-d with infinite value.1" Assigning a monetary value to an
individual minimizes the sacred character of the human spirit.
Accordingly, Jewish law asserts that the cost-benefit analysis is
inappropriate when dealing with human beings.
When applied to economic conditions, cost-benefit analysis has
been criticized for several reasons. While proponents suggest that
cost-benefit analysis incorporates objective measurements, the
assignment of costs and benefits is necessarily subjective.
Furthermore, costs and benefits are often based on short-run
considerations, which do not give full credit to long-term effects.
Thus, although a useful tool when measuring economic activity,
cost-benefit analysis is often an inappropriate measure when
applied to values or when used to determine a means of improving
the human condition.1
89
Finally, Jewish law assumes that providing information may
not be a sufficient alternative to consumer protection regulation.
In Jewish law, product information is insufficient unless the
individual receiving the information possesses enough sophistica-
tion to fully utilize, and thus be protected by, the information.' 9°
Critics who oppose consumer information laws as the most
effective way to protect consumers observe that determining the
appropriate level of consumer sophistication in a given situation
practice if it leads to the greatest possible balance of good consequences or to the least
possible balance of bad consequences in the world as a whole.").
186. BEAUCHAMP & BOWIE, supra note 183, at 31. "Deontologism (derived from the
Greek for 'duty') maintains that the concept of duty is independent of the concept of
good, and that actions are not justified by their consequences." Id.
187. See Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. L. REV.
306, 324 (1961) (contrasting the "duty" orientation of Jewish law with the common law
focus of "rights").
188. Chaim W. Reines, The Self and the Other in Rabbinic Ethics, in CONTEMPORARY
JEWISH ETHICS 162 (Menachem Mark Kellner ed., 1979).
189. See supra discussion accompanying note 47; HARVEY, supra note 27, at 21; Shaw
& Wolfe, supra note 183, at 903.
190. An example of this principle is the voluntary waiver of the protection of ona'ah
by a knowledgeable buyer, generally another merchant. THE TOSEFTA, SEDER NEZIKIN,
Baba Mezia 3:22 (Jacob Neusner trans., 1981); BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Baba Mezia 51a
(I. Epstein trans., 1971).
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can be difficult.191 Even if all information about a product is
available, products are so complex that it may be impossible to
fully understand their qualities prior to purchase. Flaws may not
become apparent until the product has been used for quite some
time. These observations, taken together, clearly support a strong
regulatory system as the best way to protect consumers. More-
over, Jewish law may provide guidance for current regulation.
B. Suggestions For Areas of Regulation From a Jewish
Perspective
1. Helping to Ensure Fair Comparisons
When a consumer does comparison buying, rules against
mixing different quality items insure that consumers have a better
chance to know exactly what they are buying. Simplifying price
comparison can serve as a basis for additional consumer legisla-
tion."l Thus, incorporating Jewish law, legislation requiring
equivalents in packaging sizes and weights should aid the consumer
in comparing prices and improve the welfare of the communi-
ty.193 Certainly, some stores put markers on their shelves show-
ing equivalent weights. This practice, however, is not prevalent as
many stores make no attempt to aid the consumer's buying
decisions.94
2. Reducing Deceptive Practices
Jewish law prohibits merchants from using deceptive practices
to the detriment of consumers. Rabbi Judah worried that retailers
would give popcorn to children to entice them into the store; the
Tosefta condemns situations where merchants sprinkle wine on the
191. Grether, et al., supra note 25, at 277; MICKLEBURGH, supra note 26, at 3.
192. In fact, simplifying price comparison was the express goal of Congress when it
drafted the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act. Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, § 2, Pub.
L. No. 89-755, 80 Stat. 1296 (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. 99 1451-1461 (1988)).
Stores are largely exempt, however, from the provisions of this law, so cross-product
comparisons are not mandated. 39 U.S.C. § 1452(b). Also, the Act only requires
disclosure of the product's net contents, not a more useful measure such as price per
pound; nor are standard package sizes or standard weights required. Id §§ 1453,
1454(c)(1).
193. ECONOMICS OF CONSUMER PROTECrION, supra note 36, at 54.
194. See supra text accompanying note 190.
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ground to arouse the customers' senses when walking by the
store. 95 Examples of the rabbis' desire to control practices that
confuse buyers already in the store include the regulations against
selling sifted grain and mixing produce, as discussed earlier.196
Jewish law does not hesitate to regulate certain practices that
clearly cause confusion.
The language that retailers use to encourage consumers to
shop at their stores presents another significant problem. Terms
such as "sale," "sale price," "special purchase," "close out sale,"
"50% off," "going out of business," "everything must go," and
other similar phrases, are often used without any uniform meaning.
Public hearings clearly show that both retailers and consumers are
unclear about the definitions of these terms and that these terms
have been used by retailers to intentionally deceive consumers.
197
As Jewish law regulates the use of deceptive words, so the
legislature should consider standardizing or banning misused and
deceptive terms.198
Jewish law places a duty on sellers to inform potential buyers
of all defects and blemishes in their merchandise.' 99 Media
advertisements, however, generally supply superficial information
that exclusively points to the positive qualities of a particular
product.2" Advertisers motivate consumers to purchase their
products rather than provide consumers with essential informa-
tion." Advertisers do not design advertisements to underscore
195. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Mezia 4:12 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933);
THE TOSEFTA, SEDER NEZIKIN, Baba Mezia 3:27 (Jacob Neusner trans., 1981).
196. See supra notes 104-29.
197. See Transcript of Proceedings of the California Attorney General's Public Hearing
on Retail Advertising of Sale and Comparative Prices held Aug. 23 and 29, 1983, in Los
Angeles, California. Some sellers interpreted the term "sale" as an item for sale and not
necessarily item(s) sold below their normal price. Eighty-two percent of respondents to
a Gallup poll say the product labels or reports they read are sometimes contradictory.
Gallup Poll, Jan.-Feb. 1993, para. 1, available in WESTLAW, Poll Library.
198. SIR GORDON BORRIE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY-
BOLD SPIRITS AND TIMOROUS SOULS 128 (1984). The author also discussed the problem
of "price comparisons," that usually show a particular product being sold for less than its
competition. Although there is a requirement to provide the consumer with the sources
of information used in the comparison, a general feeling still exists that price comparisons
are easily manipulated and are intentionally arranged to confuse consumers. Id. at 128.
199. HOROWITz, supra note 12, at 367.
200. Grether et al., supra note 25, at 2.
201. For example, a manufacturer of shallow above-ground swimming pools was
promoting its product by illustrations of people diving into the pools from well above the
water. Koenig v. Muskin Corp., No. 701, A-1973 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Nov. 8, 1982). Such diving
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product defects or consumer dissatisfaction.2" Current law
permits some advertising that is deceptive without being false.
2°3
Jewish law prohibits merchants from disguising defects,'
hiding old produce under new produce,2°5 and engaging in other
practices that make it difficult for consumers detect poor quality.
Jewish law supports regulations aimed at providing consumers with
complete information about the quality of items being purchased.
Consequently, measures should be adopted to redress the
imbalance of one-sided promotional messages.2' One way to
redress the imbalance is to require a percentage of all judgments
for false advertising to be placed in a public fund to provide
media-time for consumer-based organizations.2
caused one user to become a quadriplegic. Id
202. Labeling requirements can only counteract the seductions of advertising when
those labels provide complete and consistent information, are read and understood, and
are powerful in their effect on the consumer. Even then, consumers may succumb to
skillful marketing. See EDWARD M. SWARTZ, SLAUGHTER By PRODUCT § 7.52 at 72-73
(1993 Cum. Supp.) (suggesting a defense against the toy industry's "megabuck marketing"
by featuring dangerous toys in "wanted posters" that would be distributed through the
media and in public places).
203. CRANSTON, supra note 60, at 137. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), confers a private right of action on "any person who
believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any ... false description or
representation" in connection with goods or services in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1989). In addition, plaintiffs can sometimes bring suit based on the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), alleging the false advertising as the "pattern of
racketeering activity". 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1989); KENNETH A. PLEVAN & MIRIAM L.
SIROKY, ADVERTISING COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 90-92 (2d ed. 1991).
Sections 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibit false, deceptive, or
"unfair" advertising. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), § 52(b) (1989). This Act lost much of its
enforceability because of changes in FTC policy during the Reagan era that raised the
required evidentiary threshold. See FTC's Policy Statement on Deception, sent to Chairman
of Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee and House Energy and
Commerce Committee, reprinted in 45 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 689 (1983)
and its dissent, published in 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 372 (1984).
204. THE MISHNAH, SEDER NIZIKIN, Baba Mezia 4:12 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933).
205. Id. at 4:11.
206. Examples of measures aimed at this goal include the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 388(c) (1977) (imposing liability for failing to warn product users); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) (imposing a duty to warn users of risks of product).
207. ECONOMICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 36, at 9. In General
Nutrition, Inc., an advertiser had made false health-related claims in connection with food
and vitamin products. In lieu of redress, the advertiser agreed to pay $600,000 to be
equally divided between the American Diabetes Association, the American Cancer
Society, and the American Heart Association. In re General Nutrition, Inc., 111 F.T.C.
387 (1989).
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3. Limiting Profits for Consumer Goods
Jewish law regulates the amount of profit that retailers can
make on consumer items.2 8 Instead of trusting the marketplace
to set fair values, Jewish law suggests the need for a regulator and
even allows the use of a commissioner to enforce fair prices.2'
Perhaps courts should assume the role of regulator and be trusted
to balance freedom of contract with a doctrine of a fair exchange.
Specialized administrative courts for consumer complaints could
speedily deal with these issues and not unduly burden the general
court system. To promote fair policy, an implied warranty of
adequate consideration should be added to existing implied
warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and
good title. To ensure a fair marketplace, courts should be
encouraged to examine the fairness of consumer transactions.
4. Altering Legal Presumptions to Benefit Consumers
Courts play a significant role in defining the rules and the
assumptions that govern business transactions. Legal outcomes
often favor business due to the influence of the traditional notions
of "caveat emptor" and "freedom of contract." Jewish law rejects
this bias, as do many individuals in our society who expect the
courts to protect the less powerful. Jewish law strongly encourages
modern-day judges to realize that these notions have placed
consumers at a disadvantage. Courts should consider that an
increase in consumer protection legislation signals a new conscious-
ness in our society to protect consumers.21 ° Historically, retailers
and manufacturers have held legally dominant positions.211
Courts should adjust existing legal presumptions to protect
consumers against retailers and manufacturers.212
208. Schaefer, supra note 24, at 80.
209. HIRSCH, supra note 24, at 69.
210. According to a Roper poll, eighty-three percent of respondents believe that
business has a "definite responsibility" to make products safe for use. Roper Poll, Dec.
1986, para. 1, available in WESTLAW, Poll Library.
211. "Given the imbalance of knowledge and resources between a business enterprise
and each of its customers,. . . it is more rational ... to require a manufacturer to confirm
his affirmative product claims rather than impose a burden upon each individual consumer
to test, investigate, or experiment for himself." In re Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62 (1972).
212. For example, the court could impose a duty on the seller to inform the buyer of
all defects without concern as to whether the defect is reasonably discoverable by the
buyer or whether the buyer is relying on misinformation. Currently, the common law only
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5. Taking Violations of Business Practices Seriously
The number of Jewish laws and rabbinical pronouncements
regulating businesses, and emphasizing the significance of business'
actions, indicate that violations of business practices must be taken
seriously.213  Many U.S. courts, however, do not appear to
recognize the anti-social nature of offenses that violate consumer
law and do not treat breaches of consumer regulations serious-
ly.214 Unaddressed offenses against consumers undermine a basic
trust in the fairness of the marketplace and, ultimately, adversely
affect commercial morality. Rather than support the creative
entrepreneur that practices deceptive advertising, courts need to
support the aggrieved consumer.
In addition to courts taking consumer rights violations more
seriously, enforcement agencies should deal strictly with those who
take advantage of consumers. Some consumer agencies have
adopted the approach of educating and advising consumers about
how to deal with their individual problems. 215  Critics of this
approach argue that placing the burden of enforcement on the
consumers is ineffective.216 These critics contend that agencies
must actively enforce the various rules to effectively impact the
business environment.217 For example, an individual can write
letters begging companies to follow a particular policy, but one
prosecution will make all the difference.218 Prosecutors are
reluctant to use criminal law because they assume that the stigma
of a criminal conviction is somehow inappropriate for consumer
prohibits misinformation and imposes a duty to disclose defects that are not reasonably
discoverable by the buyer. Griffith v. Byers Const. Co. of Kansas, 510 P.2d 198 (1973).
213. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SEDER Mo'ED, Shabbat 31a (I. Epstein trans. 1935).
214. For example, Richard Posner describes the function of the tort system negligence
standard as being merely "deterrence of inefficient accidents." RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 187 (3d ed. 1986).
215. A major function of the United States Office of Consumer Affairs is to publish the
"Consumer's Resource Handbook" that provides the consumer with a list of statewide
agencies that may, or may not, be of assistance.
216. CRANSTON, supra note 2, at 3-6; CRANSTON, supra note 60, at 5-7.
217. CRANSTON, supra note 2, at 3-6; CRANSTON, supra note 60, at 5-7.
218. See, e.g., Carter v. Rand McNally & Co., No. 76-1864F (D. Mass. 1980) (discussing
a children's chemistry textbook with confusing and misleading experiment directions
caused experimenter to suffer serious bums; a lawsuit resulted in a rewritten text and
warnings).
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rights violations. 219  For effective consumer protection, prosecu-
tion and other enforcement tools should be used. Agencies that
are prosecution-minded seem to be taken more seriously. They
tend to discover more consumer offenses and have greater social
impact.22
Despite the favorable impact that prosecution may have on
business behavior, consumer advocates are concerned that negative
publicity associated with violations of consumer rights may not
always deter violations. Advocates assert that people soon forget
the offense but remember the name of a company or a product
that is mentioned in the news. 1 Furthermore, the publicity of
a single prosecution hardly dents a business' favorable image,
especially in light of the resources allocated to the public relations
departments of major corporations. 2
Publicity may also backfire. If publicity discloses that the only
penalty for a consumer rights violation was a small fine or publicly
reveals that a company successfully avoided complying with a
particular regulation, this information may encourage other firms
to emulate the "negative" example of the publicized firm.
To reverse the benefit of publicity relating to violations,
consumer advocates should encourage courts and legislatures to
levy fines significant enough to deter inappropriate action by
businesses.223 Accordingly, legislators may consider using puni-
219. BORRIE, supra note 198, at 128. In contrast, "[i]t is arguable that those firms
which knowingly market unsafe products produce societal harm eclipsing street crimes."
Rustad, supra note 12, at 6.
220. CRANSTON, supra note 60, at 144-45, 170. See LEE IACOCCA, IACOCCA, AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 161 (1984) (asserting that "the damage to [Ford Motor Company] was
incalculable" when the company was charged with reckless homicide in a 1978 Pinto case
in Indiana).
221. CRANSTON, supra note 60, at 144-45.
222. For example, Lee Iacocca, who authorized a criteria standard for the Ford Pinto
that included no reference to safety, invoked the motto, "safety doesn't sell." Mark
Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept./Oct. 1977, at 21-23. Fired by Ford when the
Pinto was recalled, Iacocca went on to become president of Chrysler and author of the
best-selling autobiography in the history of U.S. publishing. IACOCCA, supra note 220, at
145, 162; FRANCIS T. CULLEN, WILLIAM J. MAAKESTAD & GRAY CAVENDAR,
CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK: THE FORD PINTO CASE AND BEYOND 297 (1987).
223. The Ford executives' decision to forgo certain safety measures on the Pinto was
predicated on an assumption that the decision would result in "affordable" court
judgments of $200,000 per life lost, and $67,000 per injury. STUART M. SPEISER, LAWSUIT
357 (1980), Speiser was counsel for the plaintiffs in Grimshaw. Grimshaw, however,
resulted in a $125 million jury verdict, which was later reduced to $3.5 million as a
condition of denying the manufacturer's motion for a new trial. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
[Vol. 17:85
1994] Morality in the Marketplace 117
tive damages to deter future violations by the offending party.'
Moreover, remedies should go beyond fines to include imprison-
ment' as well as remedial action that incorporates court-
approved advertisements, 6 delineates distribution requirements,
and clearly states the violation. Ultimately, publicizing well-
considered regulations and advertising enforcement efforts may be
the best ways to mobilize a market structure that treats consumers
fairly. 7
6. Further Suggestions
Jewish law regulations, usually sufficiently detailed to
encourage self-regulation, rarely set forth general standards that
require judicial interpretation. Similar to U.S. criminal law, which
is aimed at the individual rather than the judge, an underlying
Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358 (1981). Grimshaw resulted in a recall and new California
legislation. See IACOCCA, supra note 220, at 162; CAL. PENAL. CODE § 387 (West Supp.
1994) (imposing criminal sanctions on any corporation or corporate manager who acquires
"actual knowledge of a serious concealed danger" in a product that the company sells and
then fails to notify appropriate regulatory authorities).
This "cost-benefit analysis" still occurs today. In a 1993 trial involving a defectively
designed trailer, the manufacturer knew of the defect, and yet chose not to correct a defect
that could have been remedied at a cost of $5 per trailer. The plaintiff, who suffered brain
damage, was awarded $9 million, $2.5 million of the award constituted punitive damages.
Robert D. Kolar, American Briefing, 15 PROD. LIAB. INT'L 10, 11 (1993).
224. Jewish law contains a number of examples of multiple damage remedies for
offenses such as stealing and usury. See, e.g., Exodus 22:1, Exodus 22:9. Punitive damages
award tort victims monies beyond the normal compensatory damages and punish flagrant
wrongdoers. Yet, studies by legal scholars and the Government Accounting Office have
reported that punitive damages in the United States are rarely awarded, even more rarely
paid, and when awarded, are frequently reduced after trial. James F. Johnson, American
Briefing, 14 PROD. LIAB. INT'L 28 (1992).
225. Imprisonment of up to one year is possible under the Federal Trade Regulation
Act, where false advertising threatens public health or is intended to defraud or mislead.
15 U.S.C. § 54 (1989). No federal opinion in the last 15 years has discussed this code
section. See Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. F.T.C., 605 F.2d 294, 309 (1979); Shepard's US.
Citations: Statutes (checked through Aug. 1994 by author).
226. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 201, § 7.41 at 359.
227. While there are differing ideas as to what constitutes "fair" treatment for
consumers, President John F. Kennedy's charter is now widely accepted in Europe and
America. PUB. PAPERS, The Kennedy Special Message to the Congress on Protecting the
Consumer Interest, Mar. 15, 1962, 263 (1963). Kennedy's charter of consumer rights
includes the right to choice, safety, information, and protection from fraudulent or
misleading product information. Id. "[The] often overlooked 'educational' function of
products liability claims is a major benefit of our tort system." SWARTZ, supra note 203,
§ 12.02.
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belief of Jewish law is that specific rules are more effective than
unclear standards.2a
While not all activity can be controlled, Jewish law generally
attempts to protect those consumers in most need of protection.
When allocating its limited resources the government must place
a high priority on the needs of the poor, disabled, and elderly
consumers who are most vulnerable.229
Finally, the rabbis of the Mishnah and Talmud practiced other
trades and, generally, were not affluent."3  Accordingly, first-
hand experience of commercial abuses gave the rabbis insight in
advocating policies. Today, many agencies directed to protect the
consumer receive no actual consumer input. Consumers should be
consulted to help formulate policy so that the people who are
affected are involved in the decision-making process."
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR REGULATION
Businesses will not voluntarily introduce reforms unless there
are adverse consequences for them. 23 2 Businesses know that very
few consumers complain and that fewer still initiate civil proceed-
ings. Businesses can be non-responsive to legal influences when
indifference is seen as economically advantageous. 233 Businesses
must be made aware that there is a substantial cost to practices
which that consumers and that they will be held responsible for the
harms they create.
Businesses should welcome rather than oppose strong
enforcement. With strong enforcement, both consumers and
businesses would know the rules and that violations will be
punished. In our competition-driven society, where many rules are
thrown out in the quest for profit, a sense of trustworthiness
228. Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 324, 324
(1961).
229. Ralph Nader suggests that legislators should aim primarily to prevent practices
that endanger health and physical safety and then to assist the poor. EDWARD F. Cox,
THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 44 (1969).
230. SOLOMON SCHECTER, ASPECTS OF RABBINIC THEOLOGY 110 (Schocker Books,
Inc. 1961) (1972).
231. See Nancy H. Steorts, New Directions in Product Safety Regulation, 8 DIRECTORS
AND BOARDS 28 (1984); CRANSTON, supra note 21, at 407.
232. CRANSTON, supra note 60, at 31.
233. Id. at 140.
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should be introduced. T4 Instead of the current atmosphere of
distrust in which the consumer is encouraged to assume that every
retailer will mislead him or even defraud him, a system of clear
regulation would help produce mutual trust and confidence.25
While there is no claim that the Jewish legal system is perfect,
or that it resolves issues more effectively than the current U.S.
legal structure, Jewish law emphasizes the individual obligation to
build a just society. Jewish law forbids all deception and limits the
economic benefits that a person may obtain at the expense of
others. Jewish law sets forth the basic ethical standard of absolute
honesty and fairness. Jewish law supports specific regulation of
the marketplace to provide needed protection for the consumers.
Finally, Jewish law provides consumers, businesses, and legislatures
with a useful guide to assist in further developments of consumer
law.
234. For this reason, nations now entering the market system are beginning to recognize
the importance of strong consumer protection regulation to ensure a stable market
economy. See James P. Nehf, Empowering the Russian Consumer in a Market Economy,
14 MICH. J. INT'L. 739, 739-40 (1993).
235. Id.
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